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355 
NOTES 
NURSING HOMES AND MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES 
Amy Mathieu* 
I. INTRODUCTION AND BRIEF HISTORY OF NURSING HOMES 
In the early 20th century the burden of caring for elderly Americans 
typically fell upon the family. If the family was unable to care for the 
elderly, these individuals usually had to live in an almshouse, or typically 
referred to as a poorhouse, which were publically run.1 These structures had 
a stigma attached to them and were often seen as a last resort for the elderly 
and disabled. However, with the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935, 
there was much more financial aid available to the elderly.2 This sparked 
the interest of the private sector in building facilities to care for elderly 
persons, who now had a steady flow of income from Social Security and the 
assistance of Medicare and, sometimes, Medicaid.3 Congress passed the 
Hill-Burton Act in 1946 that provided funding for the construction of 
hospital and nursing home facilities and in exchange these facilities had to 
provide care for a reasonable number of persons in the area that could .not 
afford the care.4 Additionally, most residents of nursing homes rely upon 
                                                                                                                           
 
* J.D. Candidate at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, May 2016. 
1 David Wagner, Poor Relief and the Almshouse, DISABILITY HISTORY MUSEUM, http://www 
.disabilitymuseum.org/dhm/edu/essay.html?id=60. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., Hill-Burton Free and Reduced-Cost Health Care, 
HEALTH RES. & SERV. ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/gethealthcare/affordable/hillburton. 
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Medicaid and to a lesser extent, Medicare, to pay for their nursing home 
costs.5 
Government regulations and social services led to a large growth in the 
amount of nursing homes and assisted living facilities in the United States.6 
In turn, this led to a need for more regulation from the government to hold 
these facilities accountable and require a certain minimum standard of care 
the elderly and disabled.7 Both state and federal laws exist in order to 
protect residents from abuse, fraud and poor standards of care.8 State 
regulations provide the first line of defense against inadequate care facilities 
by denying state licenses to those facilities that do not meet the standards 
required by individual states.9 A facility cannot legally operate without a 
license, so the states hold great power in the ability to regulate these 
licenses; additionally states have the ability to pass state regulations 
pertaining to the care provided by nursing homes.10 For example, in 
Pennsylvania, the Department of Health: Division of Nursing Care 
Facilities is responsible for the oversight of the state’s nursing care facilities 
and conducts about 5,000 inspections a year that include licensure and 
certification surveys, follow-up surveys and complaint investigations.11 
In addition to state oversight, the federal government has passed 
legislation to require a certain level of care from facilities in order to ensure 
the facility receive Medicaid or Medicare reimbursements and also impose 
requirements on state responsibilities in the maintenance of facilities.12 The 
most influential of this legislation is the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act 
(NHRA) passed in 1987.13 NHRA created a minimum set of standards for 
nursing homes to abide by and changed the way that inspectors did their job 
                                                                                                                           
 
5 LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & RICHARD L. KAPLAN, ELDER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 166 (6th ed. 1995). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 FROLIK, supra note 5, at 167. 
10 Id. 
11 Pa. Dep’t of Health, Nursing Home Care (2016), http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/ 
community/nursing_home_care/14152. 
12 FROLIK, supra note 5, at 167. 
13 Hollis Turnham, Federal Nursing Home Reform Act from the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1987 or Simply OBRA ’87 SUMMARY, ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH REFORM, http://www.allhealth 
.org/briefingmaterials/obra87summary-984.pdf. 
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when visiting these facilities to make the inspections more random and 
detailed.14 
The focus of the act was on the standard of living provided to residents 
of these facilities and included provisions such as: a resident’s right to 
remain in the nursing home absent non-payment, dangerous behavior, or 
significant changes in a resident’s medical condition, resident’s right to 
safely maintain bank funds with the nursing home, resident’s right to 
organize and participate in family council, prohibitions on turning to family 
members to pay for Medicare and Medicaid services, provided uniform 
certification standards for Medicare and Medicaid homes, and provided 
new remedies to be applied to nursing homes that fail to meet minimum 
federal standards.15 
Additionally, state inspectors are now required to conduct surveys of 
patients at nursing homes without prior notice to the facility, at least once 
every fifteen months.16 If the survey reveals that the nursing home is not 
meeting the required minimum standard, sanctions may be imposed, 
depending on the severity of the offense.17 Possible remedies include: 
directed training of staff, state monitoring, monetary penalties, temporary 
management, and denial of Medicare and Medicaid payments.18 The federal 
government wields great power in its requirements of nursing homes with 
its ability to restrict Medicare and Medicaid funding, because, according to 
AARP, the federal government accounts for 58% of nursing home income 
through the two social programs.19 Many states have adopted some, or all, 
of the Act into state legislation and licensure requirements.20 
Even with state oversight and federal regulations mandating minimum 
standards for the maintenance of nursing homes, issues still arise pertaining 
to the standard of care provided to residents. There are still instances of 
abuse of residents, neglect of residents, and in turn breach of contract with 
                                                                                                                           
 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Martin Klauber & Bernadette Wright, The 1987 Nursing Home Reform Act, AARP PUB. 
POLICY INST. (2001), http://www.aarp.org/home-garden/livable-communities/info-2001/the_1987_  
nursing_home_reform_act.html. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Turnham, supra note 13. 
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residents. One of the most troublesome problems with nursing homes is 
that, at times, residents lack the ability to bring a civil suit when any of 
these grievances occur due to mandatory arbitration clauses contained 
within admissions contracts. 
This note will first discuss nursing home contracts and arbitration, 
generally. The fourth section will discuss mandatory arbitration clauses, 
while the fifth section will discuss the prevalence of nursing home abuse. 
The note will then explain why mandatory arbitration clauses cause 
problems in the context of nursing home contracts and will also elaborate 
on the specific problem of unconscionability found in many of these 
clauses. Finally, the note will address a few possible solutions to mandatory 
arbitration clauses found in nursing home contracts. 
II. NURSING HOME CONTRACTS 
Many, if not all, nursing homes require a contractual relationship with 
individuals before they can become residents.21 Many terms of a nursing 
home contract are standard, including: identification of parties, the promise 
to pay, billing and changes in rates, notice about leaving the facility, a 
resident’s right to stay in the facility, terms of management of a resident’s 
funds, medical treatment plans, visitor policies, release of medical 
information, etc.22 The contracts may also include information about federal 
regulations pertaining to nursing homes, applicable state policies, the 
particular facility’s policies, and information about Medicare eligibility and 
payment plans.23 However, there are some clauses in nursing home 
contracts that are a bit more troubling than those listed above. One such 
worrisome clause is a third-party guarantee of payment clause. 
Congress has made it clear that nursing homes shall “not require a 
third party guarantee of payment to the facility as a condition of admission 
to, or continued stay in, the facility.”24 Despite the mandate of the federal 
statute, some facilities still require a third party to agree to be personally 
                                                                                                                           
 
21 Nursing Home Admission Agreements, CALIFORNIA ADVOCATES FOR NURSING HOME 
REFORM, http://canhr.org/factsheets/nh_fs/html/fs_admissionagreement.htm. 
22 Model Nursing Home Agreement, UNIV. OF MASS., BOSTON, http://www.umb.edu/editor 
_uploads/images/centers_institutes/institute_gerontology/Model_nursing.pdf. 
23 Id. 
24 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396r(c)(5)(A)(ii) (LexisNexis 2015). 
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liable if the patient becomes unable to provide payment for his or her care.25 
While this is not the topic of this paper, it is important for two reasons: 
(1) it shows that nursing homes include clauses in contracts that they know 
to be prohibited and (2) it shows that people do not fully understand and 
consider clauses within these contracts before signing them. If individuals 
researched the legality of these clauses, they would likely realize that the 
nursing home could not reject their elderly relative without a third-party 
guarantee. As a result, many people would most likely not sign such a 
contract. 
III. ARBITRATION, GENERALLY 
While the third-party payer clauses are troublesome, they may not 
create as many problems as the mandatory arbitration clauses. In order to 
fully understand the role mandatory arbitration clauses play in nursing 
home facilities, one must first understand arbitration in a more general 
sense. Generally speaking, arbitration is, “An alternative dispute resolution 
method with one or more persons hearing a dispute and rendering a binding 
decision.”26 Arbitration can potentially save costs by keeping the dispute 
out of court and by resolving the issue much faster than what might have 
been accomplished in court.27 However, there are major issues with 
arbitration as well. The outcome of the arbitration greatly depends upon the 
arbitrator(s), especially when only one arbitrator is hearing the case.28 An 
arbitrator to a specific case is obligated to disclose personal or professional 
information that might create a biased attitude.29 However, even if the 
arbitrator fails to disclose his or her connection with a party or a 
preconceived biased attitude, this does not always mean that the award will 
                                                                                                                           
 
25 FROLIK, supra note 5, at 169. 
26 Cornell University Law School, Arbitration, LEGAL INFO. INST. (Jan. 28, 2016, 3:15 PM), 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/arbitration. 
27 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, Arbitration, https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/services/ 
disputeresolutionservices/arbitration;jsessionid=ALvhd-LJe80JUSMzp1KoBx-QF-zMe06lm5HHzR 
ct2qPVBS_dMcbf!-327060311?_afrLoop=122386677585832&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId 
=null#%40%3F_afrWindowId%3Dnull%26_afrLoop%3D122386677585832%26_afrWindowMode%3
D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dimtu78zi6_4. 
28 Jennifer C. Bailey, The Search to Clarify an Elusive Standard: What Relationships Between 
Arbitrator and Party Demonstrate Evident Partiality?, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 153, 160 (2000). 
29 Id. at 155. 
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be vacated after the resolution has been reached.30 In order for a party to get 
an award vacated because of an arbitrator’s bias, the party must show that 
the arbitrator conveyed “an appearance or impression of bias” during the 
proceedings.31 In order for an arbitration case to run smoothly and reach the 
correct outcome, the arbitrator must be genuinely neutral.32 It is hard to 
fathom that non-neutral arbitrators would recuse themselves from cases 
regularly when it is so hard for a party to prove the arbitrators were biased 
during the negotiation.33 There is obviously an incentive for arbitrators to 
keep cases, despite bias, so they make a profit. Furthermore, arbitrators may 
be influenced by the desire to be hired again by the nursing home in future 
arbitration proceedings, and thus may make the arbitrator impartial toward 
the defendant facility.34 It seems there is little incentive for an arbitrator to 
recuse himself. However, there is a substantial incentive for an arbitrator to 
keep a case, despite any bias he or she has, and to decide for the defendant 
corporation that has the potential of re-hiring the arbitrator for future 
proceedings. 
Neutrality of arbitrators is only one problem with the alternative 
dispute resolution method. Another issue is that the decision of an arbitrator 
is more final than that of a trial court.35 The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
dictates the standard courts must use when considering final decisions of an 
arbitrator, among other things.36 The FAA states that a court may only 
vacate the award 
where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; where 
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; 
where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the 
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent 
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights 
of any party have been prejudiced; or where the arbitrators exceeded their 
                                                                                                                           
 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 155–56. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Lisa Tripp, Arbitration Agreements Used by Nursing Homes: An Empirical Study and Critique 
of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 35 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 87, 90 (2011). 
35 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 27. 
36 9 U.S.C.S. § 10(a). 
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powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award 
upon the subject matter submitted was not made.37 
This standard makes it much more difficult for a complaining party to 
succeed on appeal than in an appellate court setting. Even if the court 
disagrees with the arbitrator’s factual findings and legal conclusions, it 
must abide by the arbitrator’s ruling absent one of the extreme reasons 
listed above.38 
IV. MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES 
Normally, residents would have the option to bring a claim in court 
pertaining to tort law or contract law.39 But there are two situations that 
parties can agree to arbitration to avoid court: the parties can decide after 
the cause of action has arisen to proceed with an arbitrator, or the parties 
can decide to enter into a contractual relationship with a mandatory 
arbitration clause before any cause of action has arisen.40 Nursing home 
litigation is concerned with the latter of the two since residents sign a 
contract when entering the facility and these contracts usually contain these 
mandatory arbitration clauses. There are numerous issues with these clauses 
in the context of nursing homes, which will be discussed throughout this 
section. 
The first concern with these mandatory arbitration clauses is that the 
Supreme Court has already ruled that states cannot restrict enforceability of 
arbitration clauses in the nursing home context.41 In Marmet Health Care 
Center, Inc. v. Brown, the family members of deceased, former nursing 
home patients brought a suit alleging that the nursing home’s negligence 
caused injuries or harm that resulted in the patients’ deaths.42 The patients 
and/or relatives had signed the residents into the nursing home, and their 
contracts contained mandatory arbitration clauses.43 The West Virginia 
Supreme Court held that mandatory arbitration clauses in the context of 
                                                                                                                           
 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 FROLIK, supra note 5, at 181. 
40 Id. 
41 Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. et al. v. Brown, 132 U.S. 1201, 1203 (2012). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
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personal injury and wrongful death claims against nursing homes were 
unenforceable as a matter of public policy.44 However, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and held that West Virginia’s rule against the 
enforceability of arbitration clauses was pre-empted by the FAA and 
therefore vacated its ruling.45 The West Virginia Supreme Court reasoned 
that these particular types of arbitration clauses were unconscionable and 
therefore unenforceable in West Virginia courts, but the Supreme Court 
found that, “when state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular 
type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is 
displaced by the FAA.”46 As a result, the Court held, “West Virginia’s 
prohibition against pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or 
wrongful-death claims against nursing homes is a categorical rule 
prohibiting arbitration of a particular type of claim, and that rule is contrary 
to the terms and coverage of the FAA.”47 
Because the FAA is a federal statute that Congress enacted under the 
Commerce Clause, it preempts any state law prohibiting arbitration clauses, 
categorically, that are covered by the FAA.48 Since the FAA covers all 
agreements concerning “commerce,” paired with the Supreme Court’s 
consistently broad definition of commerce, it seems as if the FAA would 
govern most, if not all, arbitration agreements. Additionally, the FAA 
defines commerce as, “commerce among the several States or with foreign 
nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of 
Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between any such 
Territory and any State or foreign nation . . . .”49 Under this extraordinarily 
broad definition of commerce, and the Supreme Court’s acceptance of such 
broad coverage, it is likely that the states lack any capacity to limit the use 
of arbitration clauses in contracts, as most contracts concern some type of 
commerce. 
                                                                                                                           
 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 1203. 
47 Id. at 1204. 
48 Ronald G. Aronovsky, The Supreme Court and the Future of Arbitration: Towards A 
Preemptive Federal Arbitration Procedural Paradigm?, 42 SW. U. L. REV. 131 (2012). 
49 9 U.S.C. § 1. 
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In 2000, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of the reach of the 
FAA in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.50 The plaintiff attempted to sue 
his employer for discrimination but had signed a mandatory arbitration 
clause as a condition of his employment.51 The Ninth Circuit held that all 
employment contracts were beyond the reach of the FAA, but the Supreme 
Court reversed.52 The Court found that § 2 of the FAA compels judicial 
enforcement of arbitration clauses “in any . . . contact evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce.”53 The Court rejected the argument that 
the FAA only extends to commercial contracts, which is why the FAA’s 
scope reaches nursing home contracts as well.54 Dissenters of the opinion, 
as well as many scholars now, believe that the FAA was only intended to 
govern commercial contracts between two entities with equal bargaining 
power at the time of its inception (e.g., a merger between two large 
corporations).55 However, with this decision, the Court expanded the reach 
of the FAA to govern all mandatory arbitration clauses. 
V. NURSING HOME ABUSE 
This paper has already explored general problems with mandatory 
arbitration clauses—bias among arbitrators, the finality of such judgments, 
and the inability of state legislatures to restrict the use of such clauses in 
wrongful death and personal injury causes of actions. There are more 
specific problems with these clauses when examining them in the 
marketplace of nursing home facilities, though. First, we must understand 
what type of behavior and circumstances lead to these causes of action. 
These are typically problems pertaining to the standard of care that nursing 
home facilities and staff provide residents. It may be the resident that 
complains about the environment or a particular staff member, or perhaps 
even their medication and rehabilitation regimen. However, more often than 
not, a resident’s family is the one bringing a lawsuit on behalf of the 
resident. This may be because the lawsuit is a wrongful death, so a third 
                                                                                                                           
 
50 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 U.S. 1302, 1306 (2000). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 1304. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
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party must bring the suit for the deceased, or because the resident has a 
condition like dementia that would affect their ability to bring the lawsuit. 
If a resident can bring a claim in court (if he is a resident of a nursing 
home without a mandatory arbitration clause) the nursing home is usually 
liable for intentional and unintentional torts.56 If the action taken to cause 
the harm was intentional, it will be referred to as abuse.57 Whereas if the 
action, or lack of action, occurring to cause the harm was unintentional and 
due to lack of due care, it will be referred to as negligence.58 According to a 
2000 study by the National Center on Elder Abuse (NCEA), 44% of 
nursing home residents interviewed reported that they had been abused, and 
95% reported to have been neglected or had witnessed another resident be 
neglected.59 NCEA also reported, in 2012, that 33% of nursing homes were 
cited for violations of federal standards from 1999–2001.60 Also in 2010, 
NCEA reported that over 50% of nursing home staff admitted to 
mistreating older patients in the preceding year.61 Considering this number 
was self-reported, the actual number of occurrences is probably greater. The 
types of abuse considered in the study include: physical abuse (29%), 
resident to resident abuse (22%), psychological abuse (21%), gross neglect 
(14%), financial exploitation (7%), and sexual abuse (7%).62 
These statistics seem fairly alarming. These facilities are designed to 
protect and take care of the elderly population and the numbers suggest that 
some facilities do more harm than good. If the statistics were only coming 
from the NCEA, they may appear skewed. However, the Special 
Investigations Division of the House Government Reform Committee 
reported that 30% of nursing homes in the United States were cited for 
around 9,000 incidents of abuse between 1999 and 2001.63 The most 
common citations included untreated bedsores, inadequate medical care, 
malnutrition, dehydration, inadequate sanitation and hygiene, and 
                                                                                                                           
 
56 FROLIK, supra note 5, at 181. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Dep’t of Health & Human Serv. Nat. Center on Elder Abuse: Abuse of Residents of Long Term 
Care Facilities (2013), http://www.ncea.aoa.gov/Resources/Publication/docs/NCEA_LTCF_Research  
Brief_2013.pdf. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 David Ruppe, Elderly Abused at 1 in 3 Nursing Homes: Report, ABC NEWS (2014). 
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preventable accidents.64 According to the report, the number of nursing 
home abuse incidents has increased every year since 1996.65 Of the 9,000 
incidents found in those two years, 1,601 cases of the abuse violations were 
serious enough to cause actual harm to residents or place the residents in 
immediate danger of death or serious injury.66 
The amount of abuse in nursing homes in the United States goes 
largely unnoticed, and arbitration clauses contribute to that oversight. 
“Because arbitration is confidential, if the representatives of neglected 
seniors wanted to hold these facilities accountable, their stories would be 
hidden from public view in the arbitration process.”67 This obviously helps 
the facilities by effectively shielding them from negative publicity. In turn, 
it may also prevent individuals and their families from choosing the right 
nursing home. Not only are these nursing homes saving on cost through 
arbitration, these facilities also do not experience free market, consumer-
choice consequences of abuse because it is so secretive.68 There could be an 
extraordinarily high amount of neglect or abuse in a given nursing home, 
but the individual or family choosing a facility may have no knowledge of 
such due to confidential arbitration tactics. This keeps the public in the dark 
about what is happening behind closed doors of these facilities. 
Furthermore, if an individual chooses the “wrong” facility based on lack of 
information, and then experiences abuse, they are then forced into 
arbitration as well. This creates a cycle of ignorance and abuse that protects 
the nursing homes, not the elderly. 
VI. PROBLEMS WITH ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN THE CONTEXT OF 
NURSING HOMES 
There are many problems with having these arbitration agreements as 
requirements for individuals to become residents. The first is that often 
individuals do not read, or at least thoroughly read, the paperwork 
                                                                                                                           
 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Beth Davis, Mandatory Arbitration Agreements in Long-Term Care Contracts: How to Protect 
the Rights of Seniors in Washington, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 213, 214 (2011). 
68 Id. 
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presented to them upon entering a nursing home.69 This could occur for 
multiple reasons. Many times, an individual enters a nursing home under 
less than ideal circumstances. The individual’s health has declined rapidly 
and he or she needs much more care than in the past, so he or she enters the 
nursing home in a somewhat state of emergency. In such cases, the 
individual may not have the opportunity to thoroughly read the contractual 
obligations before signing.70 Furthermore, the day that the individual’s 
children takes their elderly, often sick, parent to a nursing home may be an 
emotional day for everyone, which may lead to the individual and his or her 
children to not read every term of the contract with due diligence.71 As 
evident, there are emotional aspects of entering an individual into a nursing 
home that do not accompany many other contractual relationships that 
make the parties less likely to fully read and comprehend the terms of the 
contract. 
This is not the only problem with the enforcement of these contracts, 
though. Generally speaking, the common law of contracts demands that 
parties to a contract do not possess unequal bargaining power.72 If one party 
has a much greater amount of power than the other, it often leads to a 
lopsided contract, favoring the party with the upper hand.73 Courts can void 
a contract, or a term of a contract, based upon unequal bargaining power 
between the two contracting parties.74 In the case of nursing homes, it 
seems clear that many times the nursing home has more bargaining power 
than the resident. As previously discussed, many times these individuals are 
becoming residents under unfortunate circumstances. Therefore, these 
residents and their families may not have time to “shop around” for the 
right facility. They may feel pressured to get the individual into a facility 
that can treat them as soon as possible. Under this duress, it seems unlikely 
that an individual would try to negotiate the terms of the contract with the 
nursing home. Obviously the resident always has the ability to turn down 
                                                                                                                           
 
69 Katherine Palm, Note, Arbitration Clauses in Nursing Home Admission Agreements: Framing 
the Debate, 14 ELDER L.J. 453, 459 (2006). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Daniel D. Barnhizer, Power, Inequality and the Bargain: The Role of Bargaining Power in the 
Law of Contract, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 841 (2006). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
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the contract and find a new facility, but because of geographical and time 
restraints, this might not be feasible for all potential residents. Therefore, it 
seems as though residents often have unequal, if not nonexistent bargaining 
power when entering into these arbitration agreements. 
Aside from parties simply not reading the terms of the contract before 
signing, there are other problematic considerations with these mandatory 
arbitration clauses. One of the main issues with these contractual waivers of 
an individual’s right to bring a lawsuit in court is that not every individual 
entering a nursing home has the capacity to contract.75 Elderly individuals 
usually do not have a very strong desire to reside in a nursing home. Many 
elderly individuals would likely prefer to stay in their home and have home 
care, if necessary, or live with and be taken care of by a family member. 
Therefore, for many, becoming a resident in a nursing home is a last resort. 
Usually, it has come to the point where an individual simply cannot safely 
live at home due to a new or worsening medical condition, and his or her 
family members are unable or simply unwilling to be the caregivers to the 
elderly relative. Therefore, when an individual enters a nursing home, it is 
likely that he or she has an injury or medical condition requiring daily 
care.76 
Many of these individuals have a condition affecting their mental 
capacity. Alzheimer’s Association reported that in 2014, one in nine 
individuals older than 65 had Alzheimer’s disease.77 The report projects that 
even more individuals in that age range have dementia and have gone 
undiagnosed.78 This leads to the question of whether these individuals, 
signing themselves into nursing homes, really possess the capacity to 
contract away an inherent right. It follows that these individuals enter the 
nursing home with the inherent right to sue the facility or the staff of the 
facility, so they must possess the capacity to form a legal, binding, 
enforceable contract in order to surrender that right. It is possible for an 
individual, or more likely their family or power of attorney, to prove that 
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the individual lacked capacity to contract at the time of contracting. In this 
case, the contract would become void and the mandatory arbitration clause 
would no longer require the parties to settle the tort action in arbitration 
instead of court. However, there are obstacles to proving an individual 
lacked the capacity to contract. First, one who enters a contract is assumed 
to have capacity to do so, so the burden is entirely on the plaintiff.79 In 
order to overcome such a presumption of capacity, the plaintiff must show 
that at the time of the contracting, the contracting party suffered from a 
mental or physical illness that created an inability to comprehend the effect 
or nature of the transaction.80 In cases concerning nursing home residents, 
this may be done through medical records or personal testimony about the 
resident’s state of mind at the time.81 However, the standard is not low or 
consumer-oriented; rather, in order to succeed in showing the resident 
lacked capacity, the plaintiff must show beyond simple feebleness or 
mental weakness, but “cognitive deficits that prevented the resident from 
understanding the arbitration agreement at the time it was signed.”82 
Usually an evidentiary hearing will be held in order to determine the party’s 
ability to enter a legally binding contract and thus surrender his or her right 
to bring a lawsuit concerning a tort occurring at the facility.83 There are 
many issues with this type of hearing, though. Those testifying are most 
likely relatives and probably consist of children or spouses that have a 
personal stake in the outcome of the hearing. Therefore, the presiding judge 
may think that the personal testimony is biased, perhaps even 
subconsciously biased, and take such testimony with a grain of salt. 
Furthermore, the timing might present a problem. After the resident has 
entered the nursing home there is much more monitoring and medical 
attention. It might be easy to show that the resident suffered from a mental 
disease after he or she entered the nursing home and received medical 
attention, but the plaintiffs may have less evidence of the resident’s mental 
state just before entering the nursing home. 
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Sometimes residents do not sign themselves into nursing homes. This 
could be because the nursing home “requires” a third-party payer guarantee 
as discussed above or because the resident lacks the capacity to sign. No 
matter the reasoning, many times children or relatives actually sign the 
paperwork for the new resident of the nursing home. When this happens, it 
seems unlikely that the resident actually signed away his or her right to 
bring suit against the facility in the future. Even if the third party signing 
the documents has the authority to admit the resident, they may not have the 
authority to sign the mandatory arbitration clause without the resident’s 
understanding and consent. This is another instance where there is little 
chance that the resident even read the agreement, let alone understood the 
terms and affirmatively agreed to them. The third party can have “actual 
authority to bind the nursing facility resident when, at the time of taking 
action that has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably 
believes, in accordance with the principal’s manifestations to the agent, that 
the principal wishes the agent so to act.”84 The question as to whether the 
third party actually has the authority and acted in accordance with the 
resident’s manifestations is a fact-intensive inquiry, and once again, may 
require an evidentiary hearing.85 It is possible that the resident understood 
the terms of the contract, and was content with consenting to mandatory 
arbitration in the event of abuse or neglect. It seems more likely though, in 
the case of a third party signing the contract, that the resident did not read, 
understand, or consent to specific terms in the contract like the mandatory 
arbitration clause. 
Again, in these cases, the plaintiff may argue that the resident is not 
bound by the contract’s mandatory arbitration clause because he or she did 
not physically sign the contract, and there might be a lack of evidence to 
support that he or she desired to consent to such terms. If the resident never 
conferred proper legal authority to the signer, then the resident may not be 
bound to the contract.86 “State courts that have considered the issue have 
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generally held that family members who have not been granted explicit 
authority by the resident to enter into a binding contract cannot hold the 
resident or others to the contract.”87 Therefore, if a third party signs the 
contract for the resident, without a legal power to do so, there is a 
compelling argument for the plaintiff that he or she should not be bound by 
the terms of the contract. This is consistent with contract common law. It 
seems inherently wrong to bind an individual by a contract’s terms that he 
or she has never seen, read, comprehended, or consented to, simply because 
a family member or friend signed them into a nursing home. 
Surprisingly, the same argument can be made when the resident lacks 
capacity and has a power of attorney present to sign the contract. One who 
holds a power of attorney has a greater ability to make decisions for the 
elderly than a random family member or friend that accompanies the 
individual into the nursing home. However, courts still refuse to enforce 
some arbitration clauses when the power of attorney is the individual that 
signs for the resident.88 The reasoning behind this refusal is that the power 
of attorney has been delegated the power to make “medical decisions” and 
the decision to waive one’s right to bring a lawsuit in court, and thus bind 
them to arbitration, is not a medical decision.89 Other courts held that 
powers’ of attorney authority does not take effect until the resident has lost 
the capacity to make his or her own decisions.90 Therefore, if a resident has 
the capacity to contract and a power of attorney signs for the individual, 
then the resident had the capacity to consent and did not. This would render 
the contract void.91 
One solution to consider would be establishing a clearly legal 
relationship between the resident and a power of attorney or family member 
signing the resident into the nursing facility. In order to avoid being bound 
by the mandatory arbitration agreement, the resident could specify, through 
a contract, that these individuals lack the ability to sign away his right to 
sue. Residents would have to have the foresight to know that his or her 
power of attorney may sign them into a facility and that facility may have a 
                                                                                                                           
 
87 Id. at 277. 
88 Paul Bland, Fighting Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 48 TRIAL 22 (Oct. 2012). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
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mandatory arbitration agreement in their contract. However, if the resident 
made it clear, through writing, that no other individual has the authority to 
sign away his or her right to bring a lawsuit in court, he or she may be able 
to void any contract to the contrary. 
VII. UNCONSCIONABILITY 
The last problem this note will discuss is the unconscionability of these 
contracts. Another way that courts find these contracts and arbitration 
clauses void is if the court finds that the contract or the term of the contract 
is unconscionable.92 “Applying the FAA language and U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions, we have held that applicable contract defenses under state 
contract law such as fraud, duress, and unconscionability may be asserted to 
invalidate the arbitration agreement without offending the [FAA].”93 This 
can either be accomplished by procedural unconscionability or substantive 
unconscionability, but the burden to prove that the arbitration agreement is 
unconscionable is on the plaintiff because it serves as an affirmative 
defense to the enforcement of the contract.94 Courts sometimes find the 
arbitration agreement procedurally unconscionable if the terms of the 
agreement are not clearly marked or buried within a large amount of 
nursing facility admission documents.95 The court is more willing to find 
the terms unconscionable if the nursing home did not explain the terms, if 
the resident did not have adequate opportunity to read the agreement, or the 
situation is highly stressful and the signing is not optional.96 However, if the 
arbitration agreement is clearly marked, easily understandable, and the 
resident is given time to read and comprehend the agreement, the court will 
most likely uphold the contract.97 
Woebse v. Health Care and Retirement Corp. of America provides an 
example of a plaintiff succeeding on a procedurally unconscionable 
affirmative defense to the enforcement of a nursing home arbitration 
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agreement.98 The Supreme Court of Mississippi found that the arbitration 
agreement was procedurally unconscionable for a number of reasons.99 The 
court found that the meeting between the resident’s daughter and the 
representative of the facility lasted only five minutes and the agreement was 
thirty-seven pages long.100 Additionally, the representative made no attempt 
to inform the plaintiff of the existence of the arbitration clause, much less 
explain the agreement and the rights that she would be waiving on behalf of 
her father.101 Additionally, the court found that the parties displayed 
unequal bargaining power because the plaintiff was never informed that she 
did not have to sign the arbitration agreement in order for her father to be 
admitted to the facility.102 This set of facts seems like a common practice 
for nursing homes. However, many courts would have looked at the exact 
same, or very similar, facts and found that the contract was enforceable. 
In Hayes v. Oakridge Home, the Ohio Supreme Court found that the 
contract was not unconscionable when a ninety-five-year-old woman signed 
a contract.103 The dissent found that the plaintiff lacked any business 
experience and that no one explained the buried arbitration agreement to 
her.104 The court upheld the clause and contract as a whole, arguing that 
there is a strong presumption favoring arbitration.105 Evidently, it is unclear 
what exact criteria a court will identify as unconscionable, as two different 
courts could look at a similar scenario and land on opposite sides on the 
issue. Therefore, the success of this route for a plaintiff greatly depends on 
the court hearing the case. 
Alternatively, the court could find the arbitration agreement to be 
substantively unconscionable. A court usually applies the “shock the 
conscience” test in order to do so.106 For example, the Supreme Court of 
Mississippi stated that, “when reviewing a contract for substantive 
unconscionability, we look within the four corners of an agreement in order 
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to discover any abuses relating to the specific terms which violate the 
expectations of, or cause gross disparity between, contracting parties.”107 A 
normal arbitration agreement within the nursing home contract will most 
likely not be found to be unconscionable. The agreement would have to, on 
its face, unfairly prejudice one party (i.e., the facility could bring suit in 
court, but the resident is bound by arbitration).108 Although state courts may 
find that mandatory arbitration clauses in the context of nursing home 
facilities are inherently and categorically substantively unconscionable, the 
court is bound by the FAA to uphold these clauses withstanding any other 
problems. 
VIII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
It is clear, through the Supreme Court’s holding in Marmet Health 
Care Center, Inc., that states lack the ability to restrict the use of these 
mandatory arbitration clauses in nursing home contracts due to the 
preemption clause, combined with the FAA. Therefore, proponents of such 
legislation are now asking for Congress to take action. Many advocates 
have urged Congress to prohibit the use of these clauses altogether in the 
context of long-term care contracts.109 The Mandatory Arbitration Fairness 
Act of 2013 was introduced to Congress and would greatly limit the scope 
of FAA to govern disputes between commercial entities with greater 
bargaining power, not consumers.110 The bill was assigned to a 
congressional committee as of May 7, 2013, but has not progressed since.111 
A few states passed legislation like West Virginia’s that prohibited the use 
of arbitration agreements in nursing homes, but courts have since struck 
them down under the FAA.112 Therefore, Congress must take action to 
protect the elderly from surrendering their right to bring a suit, without 
comprehending such terms. This would create a more transparent 
marketplace for nursing home facilities, and would deter abuse and neglect 
in such contexts. 
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